Static inspection is about the removal of obvious fault or inconsistency before a prod uct is even tested. It forms an indispensable part of all conventional engineering disciplines except for software engineering. For example, when a micro -computer is reviewed, the reviewer will inevitably remove the case, exposing the boards to inspect their quality of build, and make astute judgemen t s as to the long-term behaviour of the machine. Before a person buys a house, it is inspected for struct ur al and many other problems.
It would be nice to think that all software engineering was subject to the same degree of care. It would be nice to think that after careful rumination by an impressive number of qualified people who together comprise a standar d s committee, the resulting program ming language came into the world in a safe, well-defined and unambiguous manner, suitable for use by program m e r s necessarily less knowledgeable about the language. It would be nice to think that any resulting transgressions to this safe, complete and unambiguous language definition, would be immediately detected by a compiler before they can cause any damage, and the program m er responsible informed of this fact in a straightforwar d manner. In such a world, elephant s fly and dreams always become reality.
In our world, nothing could be farther from the truth. In spite of the best efforts of our language experts, we continue to produce program ming languages, which are not only unsafe, but frequently fail to acknowledge the fact. Compiler -writers compoun d the misery by providing compilers which are allowed to turn a blind eye to safety in obeisance to the great one-eyed god "Performance". Modern languages such as Ada, Fortran 90 and C+ + further compoun d the misery by being very complex, and consequently exceedingly difficult to understa nd, and therefore difficult for which to write high -quality dependable compilers. As a result, much of the world's software in various languages is released full of inconsistencies, waiting for the right opport u nity to develop into a real failure. These work in consort with inaccuracies in capturing the specification to reduce the reliability and safety of our software in an era when software becomes ever more pervasive with many tens of thousand s and sometimes millions of lines of code in autom obiles, televisions, fire alarms, medical scanners and aircraft. To see the scale of the problem, few if any organisations, have better resources or technology than NASA and yet Figure 1 shows only slow steady progress in eliminating errors, the bulk of which seems to be in improving the bad ones not the good ones. There is a nice analogy in railway engineering. It was (and perhaps still is) common practice for an engineer to walk alongside a stationary train, tapping the wheels and listening for cracks. An experienced engineer could tell not only whether a crack was likely to prejudice the safety of the train, but also whereabo u t s in the wheel it was. In contrast, detecting a crack dynamically, whilst the train is running was very difficult, although a small percentage of cracks couldn't be detected any other way. Nowadays, a suspect wheel would be subjected to various forms of scanning. Such "wheel-tapping" was remarkably effective. Regrettably static inspection -tapping the wheels of software -is absent from many software development environme nts, although there is considerable evidence as to its effectiveness, and mature tools and techniques to support its use in improving the reliability of the resulting product.
Take the language C for example. Its growth in both high -integrity and safety -critical areas has been little short of phenome nal in the last few years, in spite of a legendary reputation for allowing program m er s enough rope to hang themselves. Excellent books such as [1] attempt to chart a path through the minefield, but such good advice is not frequently taken, as according to statistics published by [2] , every 9th interface is incorrect on average in C and there is a statically detectable fault about every 42 executable lines in com mercially released code, irrespective of any quality system or even whether the code was safety -critical or not. All of these were avoidable. Now some might argue that C is much worse than other languages and that this is to be expected. In fact, C is remarkably good at defining its shortcomings and numero u s excellent suppor ting tools combine to produce a program ming environ ment arguably as secure if not more so than any other language, including the much vaunted Ada, which although intrinsically safer, has less effective tool suppor t, [2] . Of course, the ultimate safety of a program ming language is how safe it can be made in practice .
So, in spite of all the emotional attachmen t to particular program ming languages common in software engineering, the presence of known inconsistencies in all commonly -used program ming languages and their frequent appearance in released systems, suggests that real error rates in program s might be rather insensitive to the choice of program mi ng language. In fact, this is precisely what is observed. This is evidenced by the raw statistics of [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] and others, whose work spans many systems written in various forms of assembly language, macro assembly language, Fortran, C and Ada. These results are brought together in Table 1 What can be done then ? From this author's point of view, there seems little point in investing massive resources in such paradigms as object -oriented design, an intuitively appealing concept for which there is unfort una tely little or no empirical evidence in supp or t of its effectiveness, when we can't even produce software which is self -consistent with respect to its language definition and which restricts itself to well-defined and well-implemente d parts of that language. Perhaps we should solve this problem first. At least it has a simple solution.
